The intent of this doctoral dissertation is to explore the origins of soul belief by examining the traits and responsibilities we intuitively give that entity. Using empirical data from cognitive inquiries into folk psychology, I will argue that there exists a need to re-examine the theoretical view of the soul as a supernatural concept—that is, a concept involving top-down agency. Our folk psychology invokes mind-body dualism, the notion of an aspect of human nature which is separate from the body, and I will explore some of the ways in which this happens. Our ability to practice empathy, to understand the goals and motivations of others, can be aided (or sometimes inhibited) by the idea that those come from a place we cannot see. Our ideas about the locus of human responsibility, our ability to apply blame, and our propensity to believe in the concept of evil are supported by a concept of the self existing separate from the body. Our beliefs about human dignity and the distinction between humankind and the rest of the animal world, as well as the barriers between self and non-self, rest in part on a portrayal of a pure soul untainted by worldly sources of disgust. I will argue that this notion of agency which is separate from and precedes the body and the world is intuitive, causing our everyday thinking about the self to, in effect, be a kind of supernatural thinking—which means that souls and gods may be similar in our cognition in ways that deserve further consideration.